Author: Zack Machuga

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George Mason

NASEM prepares for study of racial disparities in academic research

The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) is now preparing to respond to an August 11 request from Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) asking for a study to explore how racism has manifested within the realm of academic research. Johnson’s letter brings up many issues whereby non-white researchers have always been privileged to greater opportunity at universities, and it additionally reflects the resurgence of current public debate aimed at confronting longstanding racial biases. Proponents believe that renewed attention about race could be just as effective as a 2018 NASEM report that similarly tackled gender equity and sexual harassment within the academic sciences.

Of significance, the U.S. House of Representatives already approved a $1.5 million spending package for NSF to fund this exact study in the 2021 fiscal year; however, experts believe that final negotiations will not be reached in the Senate for several more months. Still, leading NASEM officials have stated that they can already start to define key questions the study would address as well as the best ways to disseminate its findings and implement its recommendations – a signal of high hopes for the initiative.

Additional Information:

https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/LTR%20-%20EBJ%20to%20McNutt%20re%20STEM%20racism.pdf

 

Categories
Foreign Support

Ranking House members request information on foreign donations to colleges

On August 3, three ranking republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives wrote to six colleges around the country to demand further disclosure regarding foreign donations in the last 4-5 years. These letters were sent to Harvard University, Yale University, the University of Pennsylvania, New York University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Delaware. In total, the letters reference $227 million in donations from China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia. The letters were sent by Reps. Jim Jordan (R-OH), Virginia Foxx (R-NC), and James Comer (R-KY), the ranking members of the House Judiciary, House Oversight and Reform, and House Education and Labor committees, respectively.

This action follows a similar request addressed to the Education Department in May, and likewise, the current letters point to a growing national security threat as the reason for the inquiry. For example, one of the lawmakers’ arguments is that governments like Qatar label their donations as “trade secrets” to prevent its disclosure as otherwise required by U.S. law. This viewpoint is compounded by the belief that the gifts are later used as leverage upon the recipients for some type of benefit, all while staying protected in anonymity.

All in all, these universities were now given an unrealistic timeline of one week to produce all unredacted records of gifts, contracts and agreements with foreign governments since January 2015. It is unclear at this time how the affected parties will decide to respond.

Additional Information

https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Combined-University-Letters.pdf

 

Categories
Controlled Unclassified Information

NIST releases draft of pending CUI supplemental requirements

On July 6, 2020, NIST released Final Public Draft Special Publication 800-172 (Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information: A Supplement to NIST SP 800-171). This publication recommends enhanced security requirements for CUI, noting the rising presence of advanced persistent threat (APT). APT has been found to be particularly adept at resisting current protection measures and evolving to conduct a series of coordinated and multi-faceted attacks over a long period of time. Therefore, these safeguards would be implemented in addition to current CUI requirements that do not cover APT specifically.

In terms of focus, these measures utilize a strategy of (1) penetration-resistant architecture, (2) damage-limiting operations, and (3) designing for cyber resiliency systems that reinforce one another while addressing APT survivability. The measures would be applicable when the information resides in a nonfederal system, when a nonfederal organization is not maintaining CUI on behalf of a federal agency, and when there are no specific safeguarding requirements regarding CUI already. It is also applicable only to these nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI, or any systems that provide protection for the CUI systems.

The release of this publication is an update to a previous draft of the policy from spring 2019. The full announcement can be found online, and NIST is currently encouraging comments to be submitted prior to August 21, 2020 in order to help shape the final publication.

Additional Information: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-172-draft.pdf

 

Categories
Foreign Support

In the News: Ohio State University Professor Arrested and Charged with Grant Fraud

July 9, 2020

Professor Song Guo Zheng allegedly was fleeing the country via a charter aircraft after learning his university was investigating whether he was complying with the terms of his NIH grants.   The Attorney General for National Security, John C. Demers noted the professor …”allegedly and deliberately fail[ed] to disclose his relationship with a Chinese University and receipt of funds from the Chinese Government in order to obtain millions of dollars in U.S grant money. […] This case, like too many others, should serve as a reminder that the United States Government takes seriously the obligation of truthfulness and transparency on grant applications, and those who violate the law to benefit China or any other foreign nation will be held accountable.”

Link to Justice Department for Additional Information

Categories
Export Control

Guidance Regarding Access to Online Courses and Research Outside the U.S.

For faculty and students who are outside the United States (perhaps due to reasons related to COVID-19), there may be U.S. Government restrictions on enrolling in online courses or conducting research.

U.S. sanctions place restrictions on individuals from sanctioned countries (and persons who are physically in sanctioned countries regardless of their nationality). (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and the Crimea region of Ukraine). For example:

  • Graduate students from sanctioned countries who are outside the U.S. cannot take online courses without a license.
  • Undergraduate students from sanctioned countries who are outside the U.S. generally cannot take online courses in STEM fields without a license.
  • Graduate students from sanctioned countries who are not in the U.S. cannot conduct research or perform services for persons in the United States without a license from the US government. (this includes GRA and GTA work and related support).

For example, if an existing graduate student went home to Iran or went to another country, or if an incoming Fall student from Iran is not physically present in the U.S., but instead is in Iran or some country other than the U.S., then they cannot enroll in Mason’s online classes or conduct research unless we receive a license from the U.S. Government.

What Solutions are Available?

Our office can apply for licenses from the U.S. Government to permit students to take courses or to permit students or faculty to conduct research while abroad, but time is very short for this solution in the near term. It is now unlikely that we will receive licenses in time for the Fall 2020 semester. With this in mind, you and your student may wish to consider deferring student attendance until Spring 2021 (or later).

If your student can be physically present in the U.S. in Spring 2021, they will be able to take Mason’s online courses and conduct fundamental research without a license. However, if the student cannot be physically present in the U.S. in Spring 2021, we will need to apply for a license from the U.S. federal government that would authorize any coursework or research they might conduct while abroad, and we should do that as soon as possible.

In short, if you believe you or one of your students may need a license, please contact export@gmu.edu as soon as possible, so that we can begin the process. In addition, if your preferred solution involves paying a student to perform GTA, GRA, or other services while abroad, there are international tax implications that add significant additional expenses that should be considered by all relevant parties. Please contact Mason’s International Tax Office for more information about this issue. (https://fiscal.gmu.edu/staff-department/#IT)

Please contact us at export@gmu.edu if you have any questions about these federal requirements.

Last updated 7/13/2020

Categories
Research Misconduct

Research Misconduct case filed in Ohio medical center

The Office of Research Integrity at DHHS found in May 2020 that Logan Fulford, graduate research assistant at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center, and former graduate student at University of Cincinnati, engaged in research misconduct during projects supported by the National Cancer Institute, NIH, and the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. In this investigation, Fulford was found to have intentionally falsified data by relabeling and repurposing existing images for his own findings. While there has been no plea, Fulford has agreed to a supervisory period of 2 years in which he will disengage with all research activity unless ORI has approved specific plans to work under the guidance of another researcher.

Additional Information: https://ori.hhs.gov/content/case-summary-fulford-logan

Categories
Controlled Unclassified Information

Reminder: Basic CUI safeguarding controls are still applicable in telework environments

Although our new normal encourages professional flexibility, standard security controls (such as with CUI) are still in place and it is important to remain cognizant how they could impact your daily routine

  1. CUI should not be stored on personal systems
  2. Printing and hard copy storage should be kept to a minimum
  3. Agency sponsored/approved virtual desktops (or similar) should be used
  4. Personal email accounts should not be used to store or transmit CUI

Additional Information: https://isoo.blogs.archives.gov/2020/04/03/general-guidelines-for-handling-controlled-unclassified-information-cui-as-you-telework/

Categories
Foreign Support

Harvard Chemistry Chair Charged with Making False Statements About His Participation in a Chinese Talent Program

January 28, 2020

“What worries Andrew Lelling, U.S. attorney for the Massachusetts district, is that Lieber was allegedly paid to carry out research in China, which, combined with his failure to disclose those relationships, makes him potentially vulnerable to pressure from the Chinese government to do its bidding at some future point.  “It was the amount of money involved that drew our attention,” Lelling says, referring to a 2012 contract included in court documents that indicates Lieber received $50,000 a month in salary and millions of dollars in research support. “That is a corrupting level of money.” Federal investigators were also alarmed, Lelling says, by how Lieber “brazenly” hid that relationship from Harvard and from the federal agencies that for decades have been funding his research on inorganic nanowires. “When people begin to hide things, that’s when law enforcement authorities get all excited.””

See also related article: “U.S. Prosecutor Leading China Probe Explains Effort that led to Charges Against Harvard Chemist,” Science, February 3, 2020, in which the prosecutor in the Lieber case discusses the reasons behind his charging decision.

Link to Justice Department for Additional Information

Categories
Foreign Support

Department Of Justice Reaches $5.5 Million Settlement With Van Andel Research Institute To Resolve Allegations Of Undisclosed Chinese Grants To Two Researchers

December 19, 2019

** REPOSTED FROM U.S> ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN**

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The Department of Justice announced today that Van Andel Research Institute (VARI) has agreed to pay $5,500,000.00 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by submitting federal grant applications and progress reports to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in which VARI failed to disclose Chinese government grants that funded two VARI researchers.  The settlement further resolves allegations that in a Dec. 21, 2018 letter, VARI made certain factual representations to NIH with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth regarding the Chinese grants.

Andrew Birge, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Michigan, said, “Our local institutions, like VARI, serve a vital role in raising West Michigan’s profile as a national player in cutting-edge biomedical research, but institutions everywhere must deal honestly and transparently when applying for U.S. government funding and respond appropriately when compliance issues arise. It’s unfair to other grant applicants and to the NIH for any institution to withhold requested information about whether the research that an institution wants the NIH to support may be getting funding from outside sources, specifically including foreign governments. False Claims Act penalties are harsh by design. I sincerely hope the word gets out on the importance of full disclosure with the government.”

“It is imperative that recipients of NIH grant funds properly report all sources of research support, financial interests and affiliations of individual researchers to ensure the proper and effective use of taxpayer dollars,” said Lamont Pugh III, Special Agent in Charge of HHS-OIG’s Chicago Region.  “HHS-OIG will continue to investigate allegations of failures to properly report information to ensure the integrity of Departmental programs.”

Obtaining research funding from NIH is a highly competitive process, with only a small portion of eligible applications receiving funding each year.   Nondisclosures and false statements to granting agencies are especially harmful because they distort competition, disadvantage applicants who play by the rules, and undermine agencies’ decision-making on the use of their limited resources.

As part of its grants application process, NIH requires recipient institutions to disclose all financial resources—including any other research grants—that are available to researchers and other key research personnel in support of their research endeavors (known as “Other Support” disclosures).  Other Support disclosures allow NIH to independently evaluate, among other things, whether research submitted for taxpayer support is being funded by another source.  During the term of a grant, NIH also requires recipient institutions to disclose whether certain aspects of federally-funded research will be, or have been, performed outside of the United States (known as “Foreign Component” disclosures). Research institutions, which apply for NIH grants on behalf of researchers and groups of collaborating researchers, make these Other Support and Foreign Component disclosures on or in connection with NIH forms.

VARI is an independent research institute in Grand Rapids, Michigan.  Between Jan. 1, 2012, and Aug. 31, 2019, VARI received NIH grants for two researchers, including a researcher identified here as “Professor 1.”  The government alleged that in applying for the NIH grants, and in submitting claims for federal grant funds, VARI did not disclose any foreign research funding for those researchers or any foreign components of their NIH-sponsored research.  The government alleged, however, that both researchers received research funding from Chinese sources while VARI was applying for and receiving NIH funds on their behalf.  The government specifically alleged that between Jan. 2012 and Dec. 2018, Professor 1 received grants and research support from a variety of Chinese sources, including the People’s Republic of China’s Thousand Talents Program.  The Thousand Talents Program is in place with the purpose of returning talent, research, and technology to China for China’s benefit.

The government claimed that between Jan. 2012 and June 2018, VARI should have known about these foreign grants and disclosed them to NIH.  The government alleged that while VARI had institutional policies and procedures in place to address conflicts of interest, VARI did not take adequate additional steps to investigate the researchers’ foreign funding sources despite receiving specific information about their Chinese affiliations.  The government claimed, for example, that a Chinese institution sent VARI a letter stating that Professor 1 was receiving “generous support” from the Chinese Thousand Talents Program.  The government also alleged that VARI knew that Professor 1 held a directorship at a Shanghai-based research institute—a collaboration between VARI and the Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica—that would involve Professor 1 applying for Chinese research grants to support work at the foreign institution.

The government claimed that VARI learned about certain of Professor 1’s Chinese grants in June 2018 while reviewing a press release for one of Professor 1’s publications.  The government claimed that rather than confirming and disclosing the information to the NIH, VARI removed references to those grants from the proposed funding attributions in its press release.  The government alleged that shortly thereafter, VARI received an Aug. 20, 2018 letter from NIH Director Francis S. Collins, M.D., Ph.D. that reminded recipient institutions of the need to disclose “support coming from foreign governments or other foreign entities” for their researchers.  The government alleged that VARI then received a Nov. 30, 2018 e-mail from NIH that cited specific concerns about potential nondisclosures relating to Professor 1.  The government claimed that VARI did not disclose Professor 1’s Chinese grants to NIH even after receiving this correspondence.

The government claimed that VARI instead retained an outside consulting firm, and, relying on that firm’s advice, sent a Dec. 21, 2018 letter to NIH in which VARI stated that it was not required to disclose information about Professor 1’s foreign grants because “there was no undisclosed overlap of any budgetary resources, commitment, or scientific endeavor” between the Chinese grants and the NIH grants.  NIH, however, requires disclosure of all financial resources available in support of an individual’s research endeavors.  The government further alleged that VARI, in representing to the agency that “there was no undisclosed overlap” between the Chinese grants and the NIH grants, did not know whether that statement was true.

U.S. Attorney Birge added that institutions concerned about a prior statement on a grant application should know that it is Department of Justice policy that entities or individuals that make “proactive, timely, and voluntary self-disclosures to the Department about misconduct will receive credit during the resolution of a False Claims Act case.”

This case was a cooperative effort among HHS-OIG, the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Michigan.  Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam B. Townshend represented the United States

The claims resolved by the settlements are allegations only.  There has been no determination of liability.

Link to the original article

Categories
Foreign Support

Professor Indicted for Alleged Undisclosed Chinese Links

August 23, 2019

** REPOSTED FROM INSIDE HIGHER ED**

By Elizabeth Redden

Kansas professor faces federal fraud charges for allegedly failing to disclose a full-time appointment at a Chinese university held while receiving government research grants. The indictment comes amid rising tension over Chinese scholars and security.

A professor at the University of Kansas was indicted Wednesday on federal fraud charges for allegedly failing to disclose a full-time employment contract he held with a Chinese university while conducting research at Kansas funded by federal research contracts.

Feng (Franklin) Tao, a chemist and associate professor at Kansas’s Center for Environmentally Beneficial Catalysis, is charged with one count of wire fraud and three counts of program fraud. If convicted, he faces up to 20 years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000 on the wire fraud count, and up to 10 years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000 on each of the counts of program fraud.

The indictment against Tao comes amid increasing concerns among federal research agencies and national security officials about alleged efforts by China to steal the fruits of U.S. taxpayer-funded scientific research. Federal scientific agencies have also raised concerns about undisclosed conflicts of commitment in which researchers hold a position with an overseas institution while they are receiving federal grants.

“Tao is alleged to have defrauded the U.S. government by unlawfully receiving federal grant money at the same time that he was employed and paid by a Chinese research university — a fact that he hid from his university and federal agencies,” Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers said in a news release announcing the charges. “Any potential conflicts of commitment by a researcher must be disclosed as required by law and university policies.”

The indictment alleges that Tao failed to disclose that he signed a five-year contract in 2018 with China’s Fuzhou University to be a Changjiang Scholar Distinguished Professor, a position that the contract describes as full-time. The Changjiang Scholar program is sponsored by the Chinese government to attract and recruit scientific talent.

The indictment alleges that Tao, who studies a surface chemical analysis technique known as ambient pressure X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, failed to disclose the Changjiang contract to Kansas and that he falsely certified to the university that he did not have any conflicts of interest.

“By not disclosing his position at Fuzhou, and certifying an absence of conflict, Tao was able to continue his employment with KU. His employment with KU allowed Tao to have continued access to U.S. government grant or contract funds, which included funds not only for research but also for Tao’s salary,” the indictment states.

Tao’s research at KU was funded through two Department of Energy contracts and four National Science Foundation contracts. Tao is accused of fraudulently receiving more than $37,000 in salary paid for by DOE and NSF.

Court papers did not list a lawyer for Tao, and his published KU office number was not working Thursday. Messages sent Thursday to his KU email account, a LinkedIn account in his name and a phone number located via a public records search were not returned.

The University’s Response

Douglas A. Girod, the university’s chancellor, said in a statement about the fraud charges that Kansas “learned of this potential criminal activity this spring” and reported it to authorities. Tao has been placed on paid administrative leave.

In his statement, Girod cited a recent op-ed published in Inside Higher Ed by the presidents of the Association of American Universities and the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities affirming the vital role Chinese and other international scholars play in America’s research enterprise.

“At the same time, we also have been reminded of the importance of collaborating with federal law enforcement agencies,” Girod said. “We remain vigilant in our own internal efforts to maintain the integrity and security of our research, including the research we undertake on behalf of federal research-granting agencies and, ultimately, U.S. taxpayers,” Girod said. “Our Office of Global Operations and Security serves as an important resource for faculty and staff to help them conduct international work in a safe and secure way. The office works to manage and mitigate risk and protect intellectual property while synchronizing efforts related to international work, export compliance and security operations.”

“After the formation of that office in summer 2018, we looked at our policies and procedures that regulate how we conduct research and exchange information in an increasingly interconnected world and considered ways they could be improved,” Girod added.

Many if not most major research universities have recently begun revisiting their policies and protocols governing federal research grants and protection of intellectual property in response to the increased attention from federal law enforcement officials to academic espionage-related issues and the threat posed by China in particular.

The increased scrutiny has raised concerns in academe about whether ethnically Chinese scholars are being racially profiled and targeted for additional scrutiny. In a June statement, Massachusetts Institute of Technology president L. Rafael Reif reported that “faculty members, postdocs, research staff and students tell me that, in their dealings with government agencies, they now feel unfairly scrutinized, stigmatized and on edge — because of their Chinese ethnicity alone.”

As U.S.-China relations worsen, some have also raised concerns about whether scholars stand to be penalized for forms of scientific collaboration with China — such as participation in the Chinese government’s talent programs — that were previously considered by many to be within the bounds of normal academic collaboration.

The former assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counterintelligence Division, Bill Priestap, told a congressional panel last December that the talent programs “encourage theft of intellectual property from U.S. institutions.”

Such programs, Priestap said, “offer competitive salaries, state-of-the-art research facilities and honorific titles, luring both Chinese overseas talent and foreign experts alike to bring their knowledge and experience to China, even if that means stealing proprietary information or violating export controls to do so.”

“I have no firsthand knowledge of the case and no opinion about Franklin Tao’s innocence or guilt,” said Robert Daly, an analyst who has been tracking these issues and is the director of the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. “I do know that Washington’s concern with China’s talent re-recruitment programs emerged only recently and that the new security issues involved are not fully understood by many American universities. One result of this disconnect is that American faculty of Chinese origin who ‘didn’t get the memo’ and continue to behave as they did before the issue appeared — especially by taking undisclosed dual appointments at Chinese institutions — may now be cast as criminals when they are merely guilty of moonlighting and careless paperwork.”

“To protect faculty from unfounded accusations, it is essential that American universities orient their scholars about the FBI’s concerns and the need for full disclosure of all potential conflicts of interest,” Daly said. “To date, public reports don’t make clear that KU gave this vital information to Professor Tao. If he was not informed of these issues by his employer, 50 years in prison and a million-dollar fine seem like heavy penalties for a case in which no espionage or intellectual property theft is alleged.”

KU’s policies governing conflicts of interest can be found online, and the policy relating to conflict of time commitment appears to have last been updated in 2017.

“All KU employees are informed of their disclosure obligations during onboarding, and they are reminded each year during the annual reporting period,” a university spokesman said. “Additionally, researchers are required to certify that their compliance reporting is up to date before submitting every proposal. Research integrity staff who facilitate conflict of interest reporting deliver in-person training to departments and centers upon request and through the annual research administration training program.”

Link to the original article

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