Office of Research Integrity and Assurance

International Collaborations

International Collaborations

George Mason University is committed to advancing international collaborations that benefit the entire scientific ecosystem and providing our researchers with the tools and support they need to safely and securely assess and manage the risks associated with international activities.

The research security team is here to support and assist your international collaborations. We can help you review proposed agreements and activities, assess risk, provide participation guidance, and work with you on next steps as needed.

What to Consider

The section below provides information and questions researchers can use to evaluate, understand, and mitigate risk for potential collaborations.

If you are considering a collaboration or activity with an entity or institution associated with a Foreign Country of Concern (currently defined by the U.S. Government as China, Iran, North Korea, Russia), please reach out to [email protected] for assistance before agreeing to collaborate.

For more info on when to reach out, please visit “when to contact Research Security.”

International collaboration plays an important and necessary role in advancing research. Though many international partnerships pose no security threat, the U.S. federal government has expressed concerns about attempts by foreign organizations or governments to improperly influence federally funded research and obtain sensitive research through espionage, cyber activities, or even collaborations that appear harmless. In some cases, foreign organizations or governments may act covertly. Within an international exchange, a foreign entity may try to gain access to intellectual property, resources, or sensitive research information; influence research activities for their own economic or military benefit; or misuse research in ways that runs counter to the interests and values of our university and country. Safeguarding research starts with awareness. By recognizing common risks and potential targets for foreign interference, faculty, staff, and students can help protect the integrity of the university’s research activities, people, innovation, and global collaborations. Please read the sections below for context and guiding questions to consider when approached for collaboration with a party from a “country of concern.”
The following extract from the 2025 report, Safeguarding Academia: Protecting Fundamental Research, Intellectual Property, Critical Technologies, and the U.S. Research Ecosystem, provides some context and considerations for research security: “Foreign adversaries use a variety of methods—such as theft, plagiarism, talent recruitment, cyber intrusions, elicitation, and the manipulation of collaborative research programs—to acquire research and advance their own academic and nation-state goals. In doing so, they diminish the U.S. academic environment and the overall innovation ecosystem that supports U.S. research. Safeguarding science requires cultivating a research ecosystem that not only fosters innovation through collaboration, openness, and integrity, but also prioritizes security. An informed and empowered scientific community is best equipped to responsibly assess emerging technologies, anticipate their potential misuse, and implement protective measures. Targets of foreign adversaries within academia may include:
  • Individuals (e.g., students, faculty, researchers, administrators) with access to research and technical information
  • Pre-publication research results and data
  • Proprietary techniques and processes
  • Research and laboratory procedures
  • Practical knowledge and technical expertise
  • Laboratory equipment, software, and computing resources
  • Physical and virtual access protocols and passwords
  • Budget estimates and grant information
  • Prototypes or blueprints
  • Student, employee, customer, or U.S. person data"
From the 2025 Safeguarding Academia report: “The next section of this document highlights activities and potential indicators that may be used by foreign intelligence entities and their proxies, including non-traditional collectors, to exploit students and research at U.S. academic institutions. Consider:
  • Are there any potential ethical or moral concerns related to the application of your research?
  • Could your research be used to support activities in other countries with ethical standards incompatible with our own, such as internal surveillance and repression?
  • Are there any dual-use (both military and non-military) applications to your research?
  • Could your research benefit a foreign state’s military, be supplied to other foreign state actors, or be exploited by a criminal enterprise?
  • Is any of your research likely to be subject to U.S. export controls?
  • Is your research likely to have a commercial or patentable outcome from which you or your organization would want to benefit?
  • Do you need to protect sensitive data or personally identifiable information? This may include genetic or medical information, population datasets, details of individuals, or commercial test data.”
When weighing a possible international collaboration, consider the following questions from the 2019 JASON report on Fundamental Research Security. Before proceeding with any research activity or engagement with a party affiliated with a foreign country of concern, please reach out to the research security office ([email protected]) for screening and guidance. “JASON assesses that a powerful countermeasure against foreign influence would be the careful consideration of foreign engagements by stakeholders before they are initiated. This could be facilitated by a set of assessment tools in the form of a series of questions, tailored to the level of the stakeholder in question. For a principal investigator (PI) considering engaging with a foreign research entity, such a series of questions might be:
  • Describe the engagement succinctly and without jargon. Is it fundamental research? If not, what are the institution’s policies around creating the engagement?
  • Are the terms of the engagement made clear in writing? Have all the participants been identified? Are all participants known to the PI and the PI’s institution?
  • Are all the participants conflicts of interest and commitment documented? Are there any aspects of the engagement that are not to be disclosed to any of the participants? If so, what is the reason?
  • Is there any aspect of the engagement that seems unusual, unnecessary or poorly specified?
  • Where does the funding and other resources needed for the activity come from? Is it clear what each party is providing?
  • Are all of the tangible assets of the engagement, existing or to be generated (e.g., data, metadata, profits, equipment, etc.), known? How will they be shared? Who decides how they are allocated?
  • How does a participant end their engagement?
  • Are scholars expected to reside away from their home institutions as a part of the engagement? If so, how are they chosen for participation in the engagement?
  • What are the reporting requirements back to home institutions or organizations?
  • Who will control the dissemination of the resulting fundamental research?”
From the 2019 JASON report on Fundamental Research Security:
  • Is there a risk to U.S. national security?
  • What are the political, civil and human rights risks?
  • Is there a risk to U.S. national competitiveness?
  • Will export control compliance be assured?
  • What are the intellectual property risks?
  • Are there clear data and publication policies?
  • What is the early termination risk?
  • What is misrepresentation risk?
  • Is there a risk to the institution’s community and core values?
  • What is the risk to the institution of not engaging?
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